This article builds on recent sociological debates about the explanatory importance of claims-making contexts and the continuing challenges associated with subjectivism and objectivism in social problems research. The sociology of knowledge is used to illustrate how the contextual compromise that has sustained social problems theory and method for at least two decades is based on a number of erroneous assumptions about subjectivity and objectivity in the tradition of phenomenological analysis. To strengthen recent discussions about the contextual dimensions of claims-making activities and framing techniques, the article critically assesses the curious neglect and continuing misrepresentation of the sociology of knowledge in constructionist analyses of social problems.
email address: shier@uvic.ca harmful structural conditions, whether they are partial or complete, real or perceived. In the absence of value judgments assigning moral worth to social-structural phenomena that are perceived unfavorably at certain moments in time, these early 20 th -century sociologists recognized that no social-structural condition in and of itself constitutes a social problem.
Throughout the 1930s and 40s, sociologists built on the value-conflict perspective by highlighting the limitations associated with explaining social problems on the basis of the ostensible harms they pose (e.g., Waller 1936; Fuller 1938 ; and see Fuller and Myers 1941) . While more familiar analogous theoretical developments took place in ethnomethodol-I n the early 1920s, sociologists began arguing that what makes social problems socially problematic is not only, or even mainly, the objective harms that social-structural conditions pose to human well-being. Rather, sociologists such as Case (1924) and Frank (1925) pointed out that the problematic aspects of social problems more commonly stem from people's value judgments about ogy, phenomenology, and labeling/deviance theory leading into the 1960s (e.g., Becker 1963; Schur 1965; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Garfinkel 1967) , it was not until the 1970s that sociologists started to systematically think beyond objective structural harms by placing claims-making activities and social problems framing at the center of analysis (Kitsuse and Spector 1973; Conrad 1975; Pholf 1977; Spector and Kitsuse 1977) . A lively debate about social problems theory and method played out in American sociology over the following two decades (e.g., Schneider
1985; Woolgar and Pawluch 1985) . By the early 1990s, the social constructionist or definitional perspective had revolutionized how social problems research was done (Holstein and Miller 2003) .
Since the mid-1990s, the influence of social constructionism on social problems research in disciplines spanning sociology and anthropology to management studies and nursing has been considerable (Loseke 2015) . Innovative studies on the social construction of social problems have explored issues ranging from the impact of new digital technologies on social problems framing (Maratea 2008; Kampf 2014; Walsh 2016) to the ways in which government claims-making activities can actively deny allegations of government torture (Del Rosso 2011; cf. Cohen 2001) . While there is little doubt that social constructionism has made a decisive impact on scholarly debates about the nature of social problems for at least a half century, sociologists have nevertheless recently returned to debates about the explanatory importance of claims-making contexts and the continuing challenges associated with subjectivism and objectivism in social problems research.
In his attempt to bypass the familiar standoff between objectivism and subjectivism in the sociology of social problems, for example, Thibodeaux (2014) argues that social problems theory suffers from a lack of integrity. Because social problems researchers have continued to blur claims and conditions (understood as subjective interpretations and objective realities, respectively), he says, "social conditions must be brought back in" (Thibodeaux 2014:830) . For Thibodeaux, returning to social conditions does not signal a regression to objectively harmful conditions but rather the need to divert the empirical focus of analyses away from naïve forms of objectivism qua social facts and towards the social, political, and economic opportunity structures in which claims are made and acted upon. In Thibodeaux's assessment, investigating social problems as the study of claims-making contexts eliminates the need to separate objective conditions from subjective interpretations of social problems by reimagining constructionism as the comparative study of the timing and prominence of how objective condition-contexts influence the production and reception of social problems claims and frames. 
Claims-Making and the Activities-Based Approach
Social problems researchers are well aware of the fact that the claims-making or activities-based approach to studying social problems was formally inaugurated with the publication of Malcolm Spector and John Kitsuse's Constructing Social Problems (1977) . Prior to the publication of this groundbreaking book, Kitsuse and Spector (1973) reworked earlier contributions to the value-conflict perspective (Waller 1936; Fuller and Myers 1941) by explicitly conceptualizing social problems as generic processes of making claims about "putative" conditions. Mauss's (1975) influential argument that social problems represent a special kind of social movement activity. Spector and Kitsuse (1977:1) As sociologists whose primary interests were fo- Where they parted company with the majority of mainstream sociologist, however, was in their steadfast methodological assertion that the appropriate subject matter for social problems research is not objectively problematic social and material con- Spector and Kitsuse's argument that the phenomena we commonly identify as social problems cannot be separated from the subjective judgments and definitional activities of claims-makers was, as it remains, controversial. In their attempt to develop the activities-based approach to social problems theory and method, they essentially advised sociologists to avoid making any reference to the influences that social problem conditions (i.e., the actual things that social problems claims are ostensibly about) have on how people subjectively interpret harm. For Spector and Kitsuse, every time sociologists lay claims to the influences that objectively meaningful social problem conditions have on problematizing activitiesfor example, the influences that deviant behaviors, social pathologies, or structural inequalities have on framing processes-they not only fall into the trap of conceptualizing social problems as an effect of some more fundamental condition (essentially making the study of social problems about something other than claims-making activities). They also fail to appreciate how the definitional perspective is oriented towards understanding the ways in which social problems are constituted through, rather than external to, different configurations of interacting people. In this way, Spector and Kitsuse did not simply develop a new strategy for investigating the issues that sociologists had for generations identified as otherwise inherently problematic social problem conditions. What they provided was a distinctively (albeit underdeveloped) phenomenological approach (see below) to conceptualizing social problems exclusively in terms of social interactions called claims-making activities.
Ontological Gerrymandering
Spector and Kitsuse's activities-based perspective provided sociologists with a provocative, if contentious set of theoretical and methodological arguments to address the shortcomings associated with condition-or harm-based approaches to studying social problems. In several important ways, the limitations that Spector and Kitsuse (1977) identified with condition-based approaches pushed sociologists to think harder about what actually makes a social problem socially problematic. In doing so, however, their arguments also posed an unanticipated set of theoretical and methodological challenges that contemporary sociologists continue to struggle with.
The challenges stem from Spector and Kitsuse's original proviso that sociologists should investigate all of the "subjective" claims-making activities that groups of people participate in to create and sustain meanings about "putative" conditions that they define as social problems. By using the term subjective to describe claims-making activities, Spector and Kitsuse were not arguing that claims should be analyzed in terms of personal opinions or biased perceptions. Nor were they suggesting that the truth about social problems is radically relative or entirely arbitrary. Rather, their intention was, in the first instance, to avoid reifying social problems as unchanging and inherently harmful phenomena by focusing on the forms of social interaction that give rise to changing definitions of putatively problematic conditions, be they entirely compatible with or in complete contradiction to various kinds of evidence we tend to call objective.
Throughout the 1970s, influential studies on the social construction of social problems investigated the social construction of everything from alcohol abuse and automobile accidents (Gusfield 1975) to hyperactive children (Conrad 1975 According to Woolgar and Pawluch, studies on the social construction of social problems typically begin by identifying certain behaviors or conditions to investigate in a matter-of-fact way (e.g., abortion). Following the identification of the condition under investigation, sociologists then proceed to explore changing claims about the same, ostensibly unchanging condition (e.g., pro-life, pro-choice). 
Social Problems and the Sociology of Knowledge
One of the regrettable features of the cleavages that developed within social constructionism is that the debate was (as it remains) staged in either/or terms.
Partially owing to the conceptually imprecise language used in Spector and Kitsuse's (1977) original writings, social problems have been repeatedly conceptualized as either subjective definitions or objective conditions. To reiterate, Spector and Kitsuse did not use the term subjective to imply that claims-making activities are akin to personal opinion. Rather, they deployed the term subjective to investigate the claims-making processes through which meanings about social problems are created, maintained, disseminated, reproduced, and/or transformed.
Despite Spector and Kitsuse's clear intention to
formulate a theory of claims-making qua routine practical human activities, however, their framework was, as it remains, tacitly construed by constructionists and condition-based researchers alike as a choice that social problems researchers face: to either investigate subjective-idiosyncratic definitions or objective-material and/or socio-historical conditions (or, in the contextual version of social constructionism, to blend them). It is worth reiterating that Spector and Kitsuse never declared that objectively harmful material conditions do not exist independently of human consciousness and definitional activities. In fact, in one of their seminal statements on the definitional approach they readily conceded that, "It is an empirical question whether certain types of conditions are correlated with or associated with certain types of claims" (Kitsuse and Spector 1973:148) . Their point was simply that there are no guarantees that harmful material conditions will be problematized (or that harmless ones will not) for the simple reason that social problems definitions-and hence "social problems" as suchare always constituted through claims-making activities of some kind. Spector and Kitsuse therefore stressed the importance of developing a theory of social problem claims-making activities that does not pivot on (or gerrymander) the reality of material harms.
Setting aside the circumscribed way in which Spec- In subjectively constituted through reciprocal typifications-that is, shared ways of apprehending oneself, others, and the social world-that develop into easily recognizable collective habits and routines (i.e., institutions). They are also maintained through everyday practical activities that have become objectively embedded in reified stocks of knowledge that are available to each member of a social group through the processes of primary and secondary socialization (see: Berger and Luckmann 1966:128-189) . In other words, despite the fact that all social realities are enacted rather than discovered on the basis of "subjective" human interpretations that impose a predictability on subsequent social interaction (a kind of certainty about the everyday social world that enables continuing interpretation, innovation, and reconstruction), institutionalized common stocks of knowledge are nevertheless objective in the sense that they are available to all members of a group as historical resources that shape and direct social interaction. As Berger and Luckmann (1966:61, original emphasis) famously put it, "Society is a human product. Society is an objective reality. Man is a social product."
It follows that the truth-value of social reality as an objective human accomplishment cannot be verified as correct or incorrect by applying certain social-scientific techniques (or, worse, subjecting different definitions of reality to normative evaluations). This is why Berger and Luckmann (1966:1) took care to define social reality narrowly as, "a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own volition ('we cannot wish away')." What this definition of social reality implies is that the rela- Kitsuse were driving at when they formulated the definitional perspective on social problems.
The definitional perspective is oriented towards investigating the methods or practical activities that people engage in as they create, institutionalize, and reproduce social problems as "moral objects." The latter term, introduced by Ibarra and Kitsuse (1993) to clarify the original focus of the definitional approach, refers to the ways in which claims-makers selectively, but discernibly draw on vernacular resources such as rhetorical idioms (i.e., conventional modes of expression), cultural motifs (i.e., figures of speech), and even socially sanctioned claims-making styles (e.g., protests, news stories, memes) to portray some people, conditions, and/or experiences as problematic, troubling, and in need of remediation (Ibarra and Kitsuse 1993) .
The interplay between claim-making activities that take place in particular social settings (i.e., the subjective experiences of social reality) and the vernacular resources that are drawn upon to diagnose problems and proffer viable solutions (i.e., the 
Conclusion
The notion that social problems are socially constructed has enjoyed considerable support among sociologists since the 1970s. In this regard, the resurgence of debates about the future of social constructionism in social problems research presents an important opportunity to revisit the explanatory significance of the sociology of knowledge in the constructionist tradition. Of all the recent contributors who have drawn attention to the importance of claims-making contexts, Weinberg (2009; arguably comes closest to this understanding when he identifies a dialectical relationship between claims-making activities and the vernacular resources that condition and are conditioned by social problems claims and frames.
Yet like so many other contributors to contextual constructionism, there is a conceptual slippage in his otherwise exemplary theoretical critique, whereby objective conditions are sometimes conceptualized as institutionalized stocks of knowl-edge (e.g., norms, routines, patterns of interaction, styles of rhetoric) and other times as real world material facts that are unaffected by claims-making activities.
In its most benign form, the continuing neglect of the sociology of knowledge has contributed towards the ongoing tendency among contextual constructionists to either reify or not fully explain what it means to assign explanatory power to opportunity structures and claims-making contexts.
In its more malignant form, it contributes towards the kind of critique offered by DelloBuono (2015),
where he argues that the unsustainable orthodoxy that characterized social problems theory into the early 1990s has given way to a conception of the ahistorical claims-maker devoid of real structural context.
To be sure, the perennial neglect of Berger and Luckmann's dialectical theory of society reflects a wider disciplinary confusion about the processes involved in constructing social reality (Vera 2016) .
What is being suggested in this article is not that Berger and Luckmann's sociology of knowledge offer a ready-made methodological strategy for investigating social problems claims-making activi-ties. Rather, the argument is that by paying greater attention to the phenomenological orientation that gave rise to the constructionist approach to social problems in the 1970s, at least some of the ambiguity about the meaning of social-structural context that continues to haunt contextual constructionists could be avoided.
Hence, as social problems researchers contemplate the future of constructionism (Loseke 2015) , their discussions and debates should not hinge on the antiquated dichotomy between subjective definitions and objective material conditions. Nor 
